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Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced
in late 1997 that his nation would soon privatize
thousands of state-owned enterprises. The pre-
cise meaning of privatization in the Chinese
context is open to debate: one deputy minister
explained that the state might retain a majority
stake in the firms, and the editor of a commu-
nist newspaper said that expectations of a
Western-style ownership structure in the firms
had arisen from a “misunderstanding” (Lyle
1997). Still, while information is scarce about
the details of the Chinese plan, it is clear that
any privatization effort in the world’s most pop-
ulous country could have a major impact on the
global economy.
Given the distinct possibility of massive
privatization in China, it is natural to reexamine
economic reform in the postcommunist nations
of Eastern Europe and determine what lessons
may be drawn for China. The reform process in
these nations has been substantial: the private-
sector contribution to gross domestic product
(GDP) now exceeds 50 percent in nineteen of
the twenty-six states that once formed the Soviet
empire (European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development 1997), including each of the
Eastern European states outside the volatile
Balkan region (Table 1).
1 The short-term pain
caused by economic reform has generally given
way to significant gains in per capita GDP
(Figure 1) and the possibility of membership in
multilateral institutions such as the European
Union and NATO.
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An effective privatization
must transfer ownership in
such a way that the new
private-sector owners and
managers have an incentive to
maximize profit, and this
incentive must be reinforced 
by a legal structure that
encourages private-sector
competition for these firms.
Table 1
Share of GDP Derived from 
Private Sources
1980 1988 1994 1997
Czech Republic <1.0 <1.0 65 75
Hungary 3.5 7.1 55 75
Poland 15.6* 18.8* 55 65
Romania 4.5 — 35 60
Russia <1.0 <1.0 50 70
Slovakia <1.0 <1.0 55 75
United States 79.4 79.6 81.1 82.0
* This is almost exclusively agricultural production
(Slay 1993).
NOTE: Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1993 and was
replaced by Slovakia and the Czech
Republic.
SOURCES: Patterson 1993; European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
1994, 1997; Bureau of Economic
Analysis.18
experiences of these Eastern European nations
be applied to other countries embarking on the
road of economic reform? Also, was the road to
privatization in these nations paved with serious
mistakes others might be able to avoid?
In discussing these questions, it is impor-
tant to define precisely what is meant by priva-
tization. While privatization occurs whenever
the ownership of a firm is transferred from the
government to the private sector, the purpose 
of this transfer is to help create a competitive 
economic environment in which firms strive to
increase efficiency and maximize profit. Thus,
an effective privatization must transfer owner-
ship in such a way that the new private-sector
owners and managers have an incentive to maxi-
mize profit, and this incentive must be rein-
forced by a legal structure that encourages
private-sector competition for these firms. These
are the issues this article discusses.
INFORMATION AND PRIVATIZATION IN PRACTICE
In theory, privatization is a relatively sim-
ple process in which potential investors evalu-
ate the profit potential of each firm, choose
those in which to acquire shares, and then man-
age the firms in a way that maximizes their
return.
3 In practice, however, this model suffers
from limitations when applied to the transition
from communism to a market economy. In gen-
eral, formerly communist citizenries are likely 
to be less familiar with market economics than
their capitalist counterparts, and some commen-
tators have suggested that this unfamiliarity
could lead them to make bad investment deci-
sions (Brada 1992). This perception is not with-
out foundation. For example, a 1998 Moldovan
newspaper headline marveled that the “private
sector survives even though it gets no state 
support” (Bird 1998), and it is estimated that
one-sixth of Albania’s population may become
bankrupt because of investments in pyramid
schemes (Percival 1997). Such examples suggest
that economic education may be important to
the success of privatization.
In addition, formerly communist citizen-
ries face special problems in attempting to eval-
uate the net worth of to-be-privatized firms.
Balance sheets for such firms were not kept
according to Western norms, often deliberately,
so as to shield the poor performance of high-
ranking party functionaries who were appointed
as managers during the communist era but wish
to retain their positions after privatization
(Brada 1996, Tirole 1994). Moreover, the divi-
sion of assets among such companies is not
clearly delineated, so that a potential investor
during the transition period could not be certain
which assets would end up with a company and
which would remain with the state (Bolton and
Roland 1992). In addition, the transition to a
market economy would almost certainly cause
an enormous reallocation of resources across
sectors of the economy, making it difficult for
citizens to gauge a firm’s future performance
even if communist-era balance sheets were
available.
A final problem relates to communist-era
informational asymmetries between the ordi-
nary citizen and the party elite. Information is a
closely guarded commodity under communist
systems, and government officials commonly
possess an enormous amount of information of
which ordinary citizens are unaware (Blanchard
and Layard 1992). In the aftermath of commu-
nism, then, a citizen’s information about state-
run enterprises would be primarily a function of
past affiliations with a now-discredited state.
This implies that the group of citizens best able
to evaluate the profit potential of state-run firms
is composed of precisely those individuals society
would least like to prosper.
Yet there is widespread agreement that
shares in state-owned enterprises should be
given to the public whose efforts created the
enterprises. These “mass privatization” programs
are regarded as the most egalitarian method of
privatization because each citizen profits from
them (Grime and Duke 1993). Also, giving each
citizen a stake in privatization increases public
support for the program and reduces the gov-
ernment’s ability to renege on its privatization
commitments (see the box entitled “Credible
Commitments and Privatization”).
Is there a socially optimal distribution of
ownership shares when ordinary citizens are
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unable to evaluate the prospective financial per-
formance of state-run enterprises but commu-
nist functionaries are capable of making such
evaluations? Perhaps surprisingly, there are
some conditions under which this question can
be answered in the affirmative. For example,
suppose that shares are to be divided among
the citizenry subject to three conditions:
1. Every share must be distributed to a cit-
izen.
2. The expected profit of each citizen
must be equal.
3. The risk (variance) borne by each citi-
zen must be equal and must be as low
as possible, subject to all other condi-
tions.
Only one portfolio of shares meets these
three criteria: a distribution in which each citi-
zen receives an equal percentage of each enter-
prise.
4 Moreover, such a distribution can be
implemented even if those in charge of privati-
zation cannot evaluate the financial viability of
state-owned firms—an important consideration
in countries where government economic deci-
sion-making prowess is at best questionable.
There are no examples of large-scale pri-
vatizations in which each citizen was given an
equal share in each state-owned enterprise.
However, the equal-share distribution is a special
case of the voucher-based privatization programs
implemented by, among others, Poland and
Czechoslovakia (which split into Slovakia and the
Czech Republic on January 1, 1993). In these
mass privatization programs, each citizen re-
ceived an equal amount of purchasing power,
which could be used to obtain shares of state
enterprises. However, these and other mass priva-
tization programs must confront certain problems.
HOLDING COMPANIES AND 
EFFECTIVE PRIVATIZATION
Problems of Dispersed Ownership
Mass privatization carries with it a serious
problem: no single investor has the ability to
oversee management. Since managers do not
own their firms, shareholders must oversee
managers to ensure that management makes
every effort to maximize profit (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). However, mass privatization
can produce a situation in which an enormous
number of individuals hold only a small number
of shares. Under this scenario, no single investor
would have sufficient incentive to monitor man-
agerial activity, even though every investor
would gain by such monitoring (Gray 1996).
Without a resolution to this problem, firms
might perform no better after privatization than
they had before privatization.
5 Such a situation
points to the difference between the act of pri-
vatization (transferring ownership to the private
sector) and an effective privatization.
The oversight issue is especially problem-
atic because of the temptation to retain com-
munist-era managers during the transition
period and let investors decide later whether to
remove them. In Russia and the Ukraine, such
holdover managers routinely used bribes and
intimidation to forestall their replacements
(Roland 1994), a maneuver that has been
dubbed “grab-ization” by the media (Seely
1993). In Hungary, managers often held posi-
tions in local government, and the patronage
opportunities afforded by such an arrangement
encouraged local governments to resist both
managerial replacement and the overall privati-
zation effort (Bolton and Roland 1992). Finally,
some managers across Eastern Europe simply
seized firms from the state and began operating
them as private businesses (Voszka 1993). This
“spontaneous privatization” of firms was aided
by a lack of information, even on the part of
government, about which assets belonged to
the state (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994).
When owners were able to replace manage-
ment despite these problems, empirical evi-
dence suggests such replacement helped
Credible Commitments and Privatization
Privatization helps promote economic growth by ensuring that firm owners have
an incentive to maximize profit. However, one important aspect of any privatization
program is the possibility of revocation (Weingast 1995). Unless those who become
owners of privatized enterprises believe the government will allow them to keep the
fruits of their labors, there is little reason to believe these owners will invest time and
effort in their enterprises.
The importance of political commitment to the privatization process can be illus-
trated through an examination of Russia’s New Economic Policy.* Shortly after the
communist takeover of 1917, Bolshevik leaders confiscated private farmland in what
they called the “crusade for bread.” Though the peasantry was ordered to continue
working the fields, all farm output would go to the state rather than the workers.This
policy reduced peasant effort to such an extent that mass starvation ensued, fol-
lowed by peasant riots that began to threaten the survival of the Bolshevik regime. In
response, Lenin introduced a partial privatization of farmland and a partial restora-
tion of farmers’ right to sell excess produce to ordinary Russians, arguing that peas-
ants would not work at maximum efficiency unless they were able to reap the
rewards of their labors.
But would the communist regime—which had previously viewed private prop-
erty as anathema—be willing to commit to the New Economic Policy for the foresee-
able future? Nove (1992) recounts the words of a communist official who complained
New Economic Policy supporters “demand of us a promise that we will never, i.e. not
in 15 or 20 years, confiscate or expropriate” farmland, to encourage peasant farmers
to work without fear that the state would seize their crops and confiscate their land.
This the official refused to do: in his words, expropriation of farmland by the state
would occur “when the time comes for so doing.”
The productivity gains from the New Economic Policy were short-lived, partly
because of these fears. Farmland was then reconfiscated in a new effort to abolish
private farming.
* Details of the New Economic Policy are taken from Nove (1992).20
increase the economic performance of priva-
tized firms in Eastern Europe (Dyck 1997). But
in a world of dispersed ownership, such
replacement may be unlikely to occur.
Holding Companies as a Solution
To address these concerns, many econo-
mists have recommended the creation of a small
number of powerful shareholders (Bolton and
Roland 1992). Because firm performance would
substantially impact the profit of these share-
holders, they would (at least theoretically) have
an incentive to control management (Gray
1996). At the same time, citizens could invest 
in the diverse portfolios of these powerful
shareholders, rather than in a single company
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994). Further, the
powerful shareholders would presumably have
a much greater ability to obtain financial infor-
mation about the firms to be privatized and,
therefore, a greater ability to pick a reasonable
ownership portfolio.
Perhaps the most obvious candidate for
the role of “powerful shareholder” would be
government. As the single most powerful entity
in a country, government would have the nec-
essary size and scope to exert pressure on man-
agement. Moreover, because governments in
formerly communist countries are far more
intrusive into the lives of citizens than are gov-
ernments in the West, government officials in
these nations would be relatively adept at
obtaining information and pressuring firms.
However, governments have a multiplicity of
interests, which include running an efficient
firm but also include minimizing unemployment
and facilitating political patronage. Presumably,
there would be no reason to discuss privatiza-
tion unless governments were failing to operate
efficient enterprises, but a government that fails
in this capacity would not be an appropriate
choice for powerful shareholder.
The other obvious candidate for fulfilling
the responsibilities of a powerful shareholder
would be the indigenous banking sector.
6 After
all, these banks had made loans to newly priva-
tized enterprises before those enterprises were
private. This suggests that the banking sector
would have knowledge of the firms’ financial
status and future prospects (to gauge the ability
to repay a loan) as well as an especially strong
interest in the firms’ financial future (to ensure
such repayment). However, lending decisions
under communism were based on political
rather than economic considerations, and it was
known that loans not repaid by borrowers
would be covered by the state. Thus, communist-
era banks had no incentive to investigate the
financial viability of firms to which they made
loans or to hire people who possessed any par-
ticular aptitude for such investigations. More-
over, since it is almost impossible for bank
privatization to precede the privatization of
other enterprises, distributing firms across the
banking sector would amount to continued
nationalization rather than privatization.
With neither the national government nor
the banking sector able to fulfill the responsibil-
ities of the powerful shareholder during the
transition from communism, privately run hold-
ing companies would become the most natural
alternative. Econometric evidence from Britain
suggests that holding companies can be an
effective means of enforcing managerial pro-
ductivity after privatization (Blanchard and
Layard 1992). However, holding companies
alone are not sufficient to ensure effective pri-
vatization, as recent experiences in Chile and
Russia have demonstrated. Chile attempted
large-scale privatization shortly after the ascen-
sion of Pinochet, and the result was an enor-
mous concentration of ownership shares among
private financial institutions that were subse-
quently rendered bankrupt by an economic
downturn (Bolton and Roland 1992). In Russia,
voucher privatization was hampered by the
presence of bogus investment funds that ab-
sorbed citizen investments and acquired firms in
the name of those citizens, but then vanished
when payment was requested by the state
(Seely 1993). Both Chile and Russia were forced
to embark upon costly reprivatization programs.
These examples suggest that the proper
implementation of holding companies is of cru-
cial importance. How did the design of the
Polish and Czechoslovak privatizations compare
in this respect? Recognizing the pitfalls associ-
ated with mass privatization, the Polish proposal
mandated the creation of between ten and
twenty holding companies (Blanchard and
Layard 1992). Responding to concerns about a
lack of information about the financial perfor-
mance of state-owned firms, each holding com-
pany was to be assigned a distribution of
ownership shares by the government (Boycko,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1994). Finally, to ensure
managerial oversight, at least one-third of the
shares of each state-owned firm would be given
to a single holding company that would be
expected to oversee the firm’s management.
Each citizen would receive one share in each
holding company but none in individual firms.
The Czechoslovak proposal, in contrast,
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panies. Instead, each citizen was to receive a
certain number of voucher points, which could
be used to obtain shares in individual firms.
These points could also be entrusted to holding
companies if such companies were to emerge
from the private sector, but the government
would not itself create them (Brada 1992).
Voucher holders would then expend points to
acquire shares in particular enterprises.
The Polish plan might appear to be the
more effective means of privatization because it
mandated a reasonable ownership structure and
minimized the informational problems associ-
ated with citizen participation. In reality, how-
ever, the Polish plan was stymied for years
because political pressures prevented the gov-
ernment from choosing how to allocate owner-
ship shares to holding companies (Roland
1994). In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand,
privately run investment funds quickly arose in
response to an enormous demand for such
funds by consumers. Indeed, more than half of
all Czechoslovak citizens entrusted their vouch-
ers to these funds, whose portfolios were deter-
mined through market mechanisms rather than
the political process (Kotrba and Svejnar 1994,
Grime and Duke 1993). Ironically, Czecho-
slovakia emerged with an ownership structure
reasonably close to the structure desired by
Poland without any government mandates to
that effect, while Poland’s attempt to mandate
such a structure almost derailed its privatization
program entirely.
The examples given here permit certain
conclusions to be drawn regarding holding
companies. First, citizens recognize the prob-
lems associated with mass privatization and, as
the Czechoslovak experience demonstrates, will
solve them through holding companies if given
the opportunity to do so. Second, government
can assist in this process by guarding against
fraudulent holding companies, something the
Russian state failed to do in its initial privatiza-
tion effort. However, efforts to move beyond
this oversight could harm a privatization pro-
gram even if such efforts were well-intentioned,
such as the Polish government’s desire to
ensure that holding companies would be cre-
ated and would receive the proper distribution
of shares. When states seek to create holding
companies, the Polish experience suggests that
policymakers must have a firm consensus on
precisely how shares will be distributed—per-
haps by implementing an equal-share distribu-
tion at the holding company level and then
giving each citizen an equal share of each hold-
ing company.
LEGAL STRUCTURE AND 
PRIVATE BUSINESS CREATION
A successful privatization program trans-
fers ownership from government to the private
sector in a way that ensures proper managerial
oversight of the privatized firms. However,
these firms will be tempted to behave as
monopolies unless they face competition from
other private-sector firms. Such competition
cannot form as long as communist-era con-
straints on private business creation are main-
tained. These constraints range from a ban on
the private ownership of land to the harassment
of private-sector banks to confiscatory tax
regimes. They even include price controls,
which are not typically associated with private
business creation but nevertheless play an
important role in facilitating competition.
Direct Constraints
There are several reasons to suppose that
constraints on private business creation would
diminish the economic effects of privatization.
One reason is that constraints on private busi-
ness creation lead to monopolistic industries
(Feinberg and Meurs 1994). Although privatiza-
tion programs move government-run monopo-
lies into the private sector, they do not in and of
themselves create competitive markets. Unless
entrepreneurs are free to create competing
firms, newly privatized companies will not face
sufficient financial pressure to improve quality
and reduce prices. In such a noncompetitive
environment, privatization could change firm
ownership without changing firm behavior.
Constraints on private business creation
are also likely to harm consumers who wish to
obtain goods deemed unimportant during com-
munist rule. Communism emphasizes heavy
industry over agriculture and the service sector,
which suggests that the public sector would
contain a disproportionately high number of
heavy-industry firms but a disproportionately
low number of service-sector and agricultural
firms (Bolton and Roland 1992). In fact, the
employment share of heavy industry relative to
these sectors was estimated to be 50 percent
higher in Eastern Europe than in comparable
developed economies (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development 1997). Thus,
private business creation is needed to shift the
overall composition of firms in the economy
toward services and agriculture and thereby sat-
isfy consumer demand.
Another effect of constraints on private
business creation is to exacerbate unemploy-22
ment problems that occur during the privatiza-
tion process. Because communist doctrine
emphasizes full employment, state-owned firms
are encouraged to employ workers even when
those workers become unprofitable for their
companies (Feinberg and Meurs 1994). This
suggests that private owners would almost cer-
tainly need to lay off workers. Unless these indi-
viduals are free to start their own businesses
and free to work for newly created businesses,
the unemployment created by privatization
could cause rather severe social difficulties,
especially given the near-total absence of a
social safety net in these countries.
Finally, constraints on private business
creation place an inordinate emphasis on suc-
cessful privatization. Even though the theoreti-
cal issues involved in privatization are relatively
simple, designing a privatization program that
successfully translates theory into effective pri-
vatization is extremely difficult. By definition,
private business creation lessens the economic
influence of newly privatized firms. Therefore,
business creation acts as a sort of safety net for
poorly designed privatization programs and
thereby assists in the transition to a market
economy.
Price Controls
Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, goods
communist officials deemed necessary were
often priced significantly lower than compa-
rable goods in the West, while goods deemed
unnecessary were often priced significantly
higher (Arrow and Phelps 1993). It is, therefore,
not surprising that price liberalization was one
of the first issues with which the postcommunist
states of Eastern Europe had to contend.
Economists have argued that price liberalization
is essential to the development of a market
economy because prices are the mechanism
through which entrepreneurs determine what to
produce. Based on this advice, price reform was
made the first priority of the postcommunist
Solidarity government in Poland and a high pri-
ority in most other Eastern European states
(Vickers and Yarrow 1991).
While price controls are most commonly
criticized for obscuring producers’ ability to
know which products to produce, price controls
also act as a barrier to private business creation
and therefore affect whether an entrepreneur
produces at all. When the state sets artificially
low prices in a particular industry, entrepre-
neurs have little incentive to set up firms in that
industry because they cannot earn a sufficiently
high rate of return on their investment. Thus,
raising prices can actually help consumers by
hastening the arrival of competitors, which will
in turn eliminate the shortages endemic to com-
munism and ultimately lower prices as well.
Eastern European Experience
The privatization process is nearing com-
pletion across the core states in Eastern Europe,
and constraints on private business creation in
these states have been substantially reduced
(Table 2). However, private business creation
was hindered in a variety of ways during the
transition period. In Russia, market entry was
discouraged “by a variety of technological,
administrative, and other obstacles” (Capelik
1992). In Hungary, market entry was hampered
by a government policy under which large state
banks ignored the private sector in favor of
state-owned enterprises; additionally, any loans
by private-sector banks to private-sector busi-
nesses could be deemed improper banking
practices punishable by closure of the bank in
question (Pataki 1993). And in Romania, gov-
ernment regulations impede market entry to
such an extent that many privatized firms con-
tinue to be run as monopolies (Melloan 1998).
On the other hand, private-sector eco-
nomic activity exploded in the Czech Republic
as a result of rapid postcommunist market liber-
alization (European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development 1997). For example, the
Czech Republic’s private-sector share of GDP is
almost on a par with that of the United States
(Table 1). Private-sector economic activity also
rose in Poland and Hungary, where successful
communist-era experiments in private-sector
legalization helped persuade postcommunist
policymakers to adopt market liberalization
shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union
(Johnson 1994). These three countries have had
the fastest-growing economies in Eastern
Europe since the transition from communism
(Figure 1). While one cannot demonstrate con-
clusively that a favorable climate for private
Table 2
Qualitative Competitiveness Measures, 1997
Removal of Price
Privatization entry barriers liberalization
Czech Republic Near OECD Substantial Substantial
Hungary Near OECD Substantial Substantial
Poland Near OECD Substantial Substantial
Romania Substantial Some Substantial
Russia Substantial Some Substantial
Slovakia Near OECD Substantial Substantial
NOTE: Near OECD means near normal Western levels.
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business creation is responsible, the experience
of these countries is consistent with the idea
that constraints on private business creation can
hinder growth.
The abolition of price controls occurred in
a more uniform fashion in Eastern Europe.
Within a few years after the fall of communism,
price controls had been sharply reduced across
the region (Table 2). This resulted in the virtual
elimination of shortages and an eventual in-
crease in product quality to near-Western levels.
Reversion to the previous regime has been a
possibility only in Russia, where many ex-
pressed hope that firms would voluntarily limit
their price increases in the name of protecting
the consumer (Arrow and Phelps 1993). Indeed,
policymakers almost reinstated strict price con-
trols in 1993 to counter what one legislator
called the “greed” of producers, and the legisla-
ture enacted a number of provisions to punish
those deemed to have raised prices too far or
too fast (Bush 1993). This lack of political com-
mitment to reform deterred entry and shifted
business toward the black market (which has
seen astonishing growth in Russia) while pro-
longing the presence of queues that in turn
have generated widespread public dissatis-
faction with the reform effort.
7 Several Russian
regions reintroduced price controls in 1998 to
quell this dissatisfaction, and the national 
government has discussed doing the same
(LaFraniere 1998). Such a move would reduce
competition in the Russian economy and, ironi-
cally, exacerbate many of the economic prob-
lems to which the public objects.
CONCLUSION
This article explores problems and possi-
bilities associated with privatization and the
transition to a market economy. In it, I suggest
that privatization at its most basic level—the
distribution of shares from the government to
the private sector—is difficult to achieve and
insufficient to bring about economic growth. I
also consider the importance of appropriate
owner/manager incentives and conclude that
privately created holding companies may be the
best way to ensure that de jure privatization
becomes effective privatization. Finally, I con-
sider the importance of legal constraints on pri-
vate business creation and conclude that a
competition-enhancing legal framework is vital
to the success of privatization.
What lessons can be learned from the
Eastern European privatization experience and,
perhaps, applied to emerging economies such
as China’s? One such lesson is that the design of
a privatization program is as important as the
economic theories the program incorporates.
Unlike privatization in the West, which typically
involves a single firm whose financial perfor-
mance has been evaluated by independent
auditors, the transition from communism in-
volves the simultaneous privatization of hun-
dreds of firms for which even the most basic
balance-sheet information is likely to be un-
available. Additionally, a dispersal of ownership
across many citizens could produce a situation
in which shareholders would be unable to exer-
cise effective oversight of management. One
way to overcome this problem would be
through the creation of holding companies in
which each citizen could invest. For example,
heeding the suggestion of economists, both
Poland and Czechoslovakia made holding com-
panies a centerpiece of their privatization pro-
grams. However, equally strong commitments to
the principle of holding companies did not
result in equal success with their implemen-
tation. Holding companies played an enor-
mous role in the success of the Czechoslovak
program but nearly destroyed the Polish
scheme. Such seemingly small changes in
implementation could have enormous conse-
quences for Chinese privatization.
Of particular importance is the claim that
Chinese privatization might not move a majority
interest in state-owned firms into the private
sector. If the Chinese government were to main-
tain a majority stake in a particular “privatized”
enterprise, it could thwart efficiency-enhancing
measures at that company if the measures were
likely to increase unemployment. The govern-
ment could also block the firm from entering
new markets if those markets were already
served by a government-owned firm. It could
even bankrupt the firm if the private-sector
shareholders were to resist the directions in
which the government wished to take the firm.
One might hope the government would behave
as if it were a private-sector individual, but the
only way to guarantee such behavior by the
owners of privatized firms would be to ensure
that every owner is a private-sector individual—
which would be inconsistent with a privatiza-
tion plan in which the government releases only
a minority of ownership shares to the public.
Another lesson is that privatization, while
important, is not sufficient to create a market
economy. Eastern European governments fo-
cused on privatization as a quick fix, something
that could be executed quickly and would bring
about effective competition just as quickly. Yet24
privatization does not by itself create competi-
tion. If communist-era restraints on private busi-
ness creation were to be maintained in China,
entrepreneurs would be unable to compete
against newly privatized companies. This could
mean that privatization would only convert gov-
ernment-run monopolies into privately held
monopolies, with minimal employment oppor-
tunities for workers laid off during the privati-
zation process. Such a result might exacerbate
the unemployment shocks associated with the
transition to a market economy without provid-
ing any of the efficiency gains that result from
competition—probably the worst imaginable
outcome for those who wish to help unleash
the Chinese economy through privatization.
Chinese policymakers have much to learn
from the Eastern European privatization experi-
ence. As China embarks upon its ambitious 
privatization program, it remains to be seen
whether its leaders will look to Eastern Europe
for guidance on how to enact a successful pro-
gram—or whether they will simply repeat
Eastern Europe’s mistakes.
NOTES
I would like to thank Steve Brown, Steve Prowse, Lori
Taylor, and Mine Yücel for helpful comments.
1 These Eastern European states are the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
2 A study by Ali (1997) finds that increased economic
freedom generally leads to increased economic
growth.
3 One example is the landmark 1984 privatization of
British Telecom (Financial Times 1995).
4 This is a standard portfolio-theory result applied to 
privatization. See Sharpe (1970) for a more general
discussion of portfolio theory.
5 Hansen (1997) presents an alternative view in which
mass privatization is desirable precisely because no
single investor has the power to oversee management.
According to this view, managers who face no share-
holder oversight can transfer any profit from the share-
holders to themselves, which gives managers a
powerful incentive to maximize profit.
6 See Dittus and Prowse (1996) for an interesting and
informative discussion of this issue.
7 Responding to this dissatisfaction, the Russian legis-
lature passed a nonbinding resolution in June 1997
that called for the renationalization of many previously
privatized companies. The nonbinding measure
passed by a vote of 288 to 6 (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty 1997).
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